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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the implications of foreign land deals in Africa especially with regard to 
agricultural trade. It is motivated essentially by large scale foreign deals of land in Africa, Latin 
America, Central Asia and Southeast Asia that have been reported in recent years. One of the 
driving forces has been attributed to the presumed availability of land in these regions. This 
study employs data sourced from World Development Indicators and World Governance 
Indicators on key variables such as arable land per person, agricultural land as percentage of land 
area, net food import, regulatory quality, among others (1995-2010) on selected African 
countries where instances of foreign land deals have been reported. The study formulates 
empirical models that draw from institutional development theory, which is estimated using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  The study found LSFLDs to impact negatively on 
agricultural export in selected countries, the indexes of institutional framework used were found 
to be significant; likewise, agricultural land becomes highly significant with relative larger 
magnitude when interacted with institutional indexes. This therefore implies that as more 
agricultural land is acquired, agricultural export tends to dwindle and incidences of food 
insecurity are heightened. The preliminary investigation suggests the need for controlling the 
issue of massive foreign land deals through viable institutional framework, which can be 
engendered by building sound legal and procedural measures that will protect local rights and 
take into account the aspirations of local farmers and the welfare of citizenry.   
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1.0 Introduction 
Africa and Latin America is said to have about 80% of world reserves of agricultural land with 
Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan among the seven countries in Africa 
and Latin America that account for about half of the world land reserves. This, among other 
factors, has made Africa the most targeted region, which has recorded more than half of the 
foreign land projects/deals in the world. From available data, there have been incidences of large 
scale acquisition of land across Africa countries. Over 2,492,684 hectares of land has been 
acquired in Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Sudan. This represents almost half of the 
arable land in United Kingdom and three times the arable land of Norway. In Sudan and Ethiopia 
alone, the figures on foreign land deals are about 3.9 million and 1.2 million hectares, 
respectively.  
The implications of foreign land deals can be far-reaching; though some argue that there are 
opportunities of increasing capital inflows, government revenue, among others for the host 
countries. However, there are serious challenges that the foreign land deals may portend. For 
African countries especially those with difficulties in feeding their teaming population, 
leasing/selling agricultural lands to foreign investors who will used them to produce and export 
food to rich countries (in most cases their home countries to meet their own food requirements) 
will worsen the issue of food security. An example is the attempted South Korea Daewoo and 
Saudi Arabia farming investment in Madagascar and Sudan, respectively. The agricultural 
products produced by foreign farmers would be exported to their home countries leaving the 
recipient countries to lose in both ways: land resources and availability of food products in 
domestic economy. Another implication is the displacement of small scale farmers from their 
major means of survival due to their low bargaining power and inadequate of knowledge. In 
most instances they wake up to hear of foreign land deals made by their governments without 
their inputs (moodie, 2011). 
The major frontiers of the acquisition in farmland abroad deals are food-importing countries with 
land and water constraints but rich in capital, such as Gulf States. Also, Countries such as China, 
South Korea and India with large populations and food security concerns seeks opportunities to 
produce food for their teeming population abroad. The present land acquisition in Africa would 
further increase the incidence of food in security in the region. At a time when the food aid 
convention is been instituted for seeking aid to improve the provision of reliable amount of food 
supplies to developing countries, foreign land acquisition will dwindling the potential of 
adequate food production in Africa. With the increasing upwards shot in food prices since 2007, 
falling food aid to Africa and the incessant rise in land acquisition, the incidence of hunger tends 
to rise in the region, which results into much hunger (IFPRI Policy Brief, 2009). 
The combination of the global crises in food, energy, finance and the environment has driven a 
dramatic revaluation of land ownership in the past few years with Sub-Saharan Africa 
recognized as the site for most speculative major land deals (Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2011; 
Saturnino et al, 2011). The media and some empirical research on land deals often view foreign 
land acquisition to be due to need for production of food and biofuels for export to finance-rich 
but resource-deficient countries in the face of the recent food and energy crises. Also, a number 
of empirical studies attribute rise in land and farm investments worldwide over the years to be 
due to a number of factors ranging from growing demand for food, water and fuel; opportunities 
provided by the speculative market; and countries seeking to secure their own food sources to 
protect them against future market upswings in food price and availability (Nidhi, 2010; Braun 
and Meinzen-Dick, 2011). Many researchers attribute the rising interest in land deals, 
particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America to be the effects of food crisis and population 
expansion. According to Annelies (2010), emerging literature and the media attributes main 
processes driving the “foreignisation of space” to production of food and biofuel for export in the 
aftermath of recent food and energy crises, however, the study argued that some other processes 
exist that drives land rush as an analytical framework that focuses on one or two processes will 
offer a narrow perspective to a complex problem. 
One of the implications of land deals in Africa will be the displacement of local farmers from 
their ancestral land by turning valuable agricultural land for industrial use. This issue is a plight 
of Africa endowment as farmland is not only central to export income of most Africa countries 
(as the bulk, over 90% of Africa export goods are commodity in nature) but highly significant to 
rural livelihood and national food security. This is given the fact that about 75% of the world’s 
poor people live in rural areas (it is more than that in most African countries), and most are 
involved in agriculture (Cotula et al 2009). With the understanding that agriculture remains 
fundamental to economic growth, poverty alleviation, and environmental sustainability; the issue 
of foreign land acquisition would endanger the prospect of developing Africa countries 
especially in curbing poverty. The up-surging food crisis, growing human and environmental 
pressures has culminated into high foreign interest in farmland, which generates the worries over 
food security (Moodie, 2011). It is this recognition that the seven Principles for Responsible 
Agricultural Investments was initiated by the World Bank, FAO, UNCTAD, and IFAD, which 
was backed by the 2010 G8 Summit in Ontario. This is crucial as great proportion of African 
population (over 70% in some countries) dwell in the rural areas where their major livelihood is 
in agriculture. The export of most African countries depend largely on commodity products that 
require land for production, especially agriculture, mining and quarrying, which will be 
adversely not only for livelihood but for welfare and economic development the developing 
Africa.  
Several media reports indicate that the least land deal in terms of acreage was 5,500 hectares; 
many are in million hectares. This gives some concern given that the acreage of land in any 
country is limited in supply, which implies that any foreign acquisition reduces the available land 
for agricultural purpose. Furthermore, with regards to the purpose of the land deals in Table, it 
can be observed that majority of them are for growing food crops such as rice, maize, wheat, 
sweet sorghum. Others for producing crops needed for bio-fuels, crops for feeding animals, and 
for investment (hedge fund). This denotes the fact that foreign land acquisition is driven by the 
need to meet food security and investment that will yield future returns. To this end, this study 
will focus on the countries in Africa that the land deals are reported. 
The study submits that major land deals in Africa with long duration (100 years) and acreage are 
made in countries known to have weak institutional quality and poor land governance. Although 
investors do promise employment and infrastructural development but often fail to deliver on 
their promises as there are no strong institutional machineries to drive it. It recommends the 
urgent need for recipient governments to clarify the kind of investment, how the returns from the 
land deals are to be distributed. The assessment of social and environmental impacts as well as 
transparency in decision-making and compensation of displaced land users are also 
recommended. This study concludes that foreign land acquisition is not utterly bad but it 
maintains that the recipient countries need to make adequate assessment of investment and 
development plans when such transactions are to be made, which can be done by setting up 
committee on land acquisition charged with the responsibility of consultation, implementation 
and compensation. 
 
2.0 Background/Stylized facts 
2.1 Land and Land Deals in Africa 
The demand for land across the world has remained on the increase. The growing population 
among others can be blamed for this. Since the supply of land is fixed and the demand varies, 
then there is the issue of inadequate land to meet economic activities. For instance, Figure 1 
reports that the available land for agricultural purposes around the world is consistently reducing. 
This implies that available land is insufficient for the growing population especially to sustain 
their agricultural activities. Also, Figure 1 shows that agricultural land as a percentage of global 
land area has being on the increase around 2000. Thereafter, it has witnessed considerable 
decline with some degrees of fluctuations. Modie (2011), and Oxfam International (2011), 
attributed this decline to the use of land for non-food production such as bio-fuels, carbon 
sequestration, and forest protection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Agricultural Land per Capita and as Percentage of Global Land 
 
Source: Oxfam International 
The consequences of unavailability of land to meet the growing demand for it, has brought about 
foreign land acquisitions. By this, agents demanding for land, seek out opportunities to acquire 
land in places outside their origin. In recent times, the issue of LSFLAs has remained central to 
debates among media reporters, scholars, policy-makers and urban managers. This is because of 
the central role of land as an economic resource and the possibility of value appreciation. These 
LSFLAs are acquired for diverse reasons. Based on this, Figure 2 presents the distribution of 
land projects and their drivers across the regions of the world. 
As can be observed in Figure 2, the proportion of land deal in SSA is far higher than other 
regions in the world. According to Deininger et al (2011), out of 464 land projects, 203 included 
area information that summed up to 56.6 million hectares (ha) cutting across projects in 81 
countries but 48% of the projects covered 39.7 million ha, representing about two-third of the 
total area in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This is distantly followed by East and South Asia with 
8.3 million ha. 
Figure 2: Distribution of Projects/ Land Area across Regions of the World 
 
Sources: Brüntrup (p.3) and Deininger et al (p.52). 
To further buttress the observation from Figure 2, Anseeuw et al claimed that Africa is the most 
targeted. They observed that from the 754 land deals for which information was available, 56.2 
million ha are located in Africa, 17.1 million ha in Asia and 7 million in Latin America. A 
stunning revelation from their data is that out of the 11 most targeted countries by foreign land 
investors, about 64% are African namely, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Sudan and Zambia.  
One of the implications of these land deals is the displacement of local farmers from their 
ancestral land by turning valuable agricultural land for industrial purposes. Paradoxically, these 
industrial development and production are not targeted at the benefit of the host community, but 
for the needs of the countries of origin. Anseeuw et al, observed that of the 393 land cases where 
information on the destination of production from foreign land investors is available, domestic 
markets are of little concerns. 
This issue is a plight for Africa endowment as farmland is highly significant to rural livelihood 
and national food security. Moodle, and Oxfam International noted that the growing human and 
environmental pressure accompanied by land acquisition has generated the worries over food 
security. The food price crisis has increased the anticipated returns on land and water resources, 
making farmland prices increase across the world.  
A summary of the major land deals reported in some African countries are presented in Table 1. 
The land deals reported in Table 1 involved both private foreign firms acquiring land in Africa 
and those that involved governments, for the period 2006-2009.  
Table 1:  Summary of Land Deals in Africa (2006-2009) 
Target country Investor’s country Nature of Land Deals 
Angola Lonrho (UK) 25000 ha leased for rice. Lonrho is negotiating for a further 125,000 ha in 
Mali and Malawi. 
Cameroun Unknown company (China) 10,000 ha secured for rice. 
Congo, DR China (ZTE International) 2-8 million ha secured for biofuel oil palm plantation. 
Congo,DR Agriculture South Africa (South 
Africa) 
10 million ha offered to farmers’ union. 
Egypt Jenat (Saudi Arabia) 10,000 ha secured for barley, wheat, and livestock feed. 
Ethiopia Flora Ecopower (Germany) 13,000 ha secured for biofuel crops; contract farming arrangement. 
Ethiopia Sun Biofuel (UK) Land secured for Jatropa (biofuel).  
Ethiopia India US$4 billion invested, including agriculture, flower growing and sugar 
estates. 
Ethiopia Unknown private investors 
(Saudi Arabia) 
Land leased in exchange for US$100 million investment. 
Kenya  Qatar 40,000 ha leased for fruit and vegetable cultivation in exchange for funding 
US$2.3 billion port. 
Madagascar Daewoo (South Korea)  1.3 million ha secured for maize. 
Malawi Djibouti Unknown area of farm land leased. 
Mali Libya 100,000 ha leased for rice. 
Mozambique Skebab (Sweden) 100,000 ha secured for biofuel crops. 
Mozambique China US$800 million investment to expand rice production from 100,000 to 
500,000 metric tons; political opposition to deal. 
Nigeria Trans4mation Agrictech Ltd 
(UK) 
10,000 ha secured. 
Sudan Egypt Land secured to grow 2 million tons of wheat annually. 
Sudan  Jordan 25000 ha secured for livestock and crops. 
Sudan Kuwait ‘Giant’ strategic partnership; no further information. 
Sudan Qatar Joint holding company setup to invest in agriculture. 
Sudan  Saudi Arabi (Hail Agricultural 
Dev. Co) 
9,200-10,117 ha leased for wheat, vegetables and animal feed: 60% paid by 
Saudi government. 
Sudan South Korea 690,000 ha secured for wheat. 
Sudan United Arab Emirates (UAE) 378,000 ha total invested in by UAE. 
Sudan UAE (Abu Dhabi fund for 
development) 
30,000 ha secured for corn, alfalfa, and possibly wheat, potatoes, and beans. 
Sudan Jarch capital (USA) 400,000 ha in Southern Sudan signed with local army commander. 
Tanzania CAMS Group (UK) 45,000 ha purchased for sweet sorghum. 
Tanzania Sun Biofuels (UK) 5,500 ha secured for Jatropa (biofuel). 
Tanzania Saudi Arabia 500,000 ha requested for lease. 
Tanzania China (Chongqing seed corp) 3000 ha secured for rice. 
Zambia China  2 million ha requested for Jatropha (biofuel). 
Note: In addition to the countries in this Table, land deals have also been reported in Ghana and Sierra Leone. 
 Source: Compiled from IFPRI Policy (2009) Brief 13. 
Apart from Djibouti, Egypt, Libya and South Africa that have been reported to be involved in 
land deal in Malawi, Mali, Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), respectively, all 
other land deals reported in Table 1 involved countries in the Middle East (Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia), Asia (Jordan, South Korea, China, India), Europe (Sweden, Germany, UK) and 
America (USA). As reported in the Table, the least land deal in terms of acreage was 3,000 ha; 
many are in million ha. This gives some concern given that the acreage of land in any country is 
limited in supply, which implies that any LSFLDs will reduce the available land for agricultural 
purpose.  
In terms of the purpose of the land deals as reported, it can be observed that some of these deals 
are for growing food crops such as rice, maize, wheat, sweet sorghum.  A sizeable fraction is 
proposed for producing crops needed for bio-fuels, and feeding animals. This denotes the fact 
that LSFLDs is driven by the need to meet food security and investment that is anticipated to 
yield future returns. Table 2 further portends that LSFLDs are focused on agricultural 
production, which represents 32.5 million ha, compared to tourism and industry that accounts for 
only 2.3 and 0.1 million ha. 
 
Table 2:  Sectors Affected by Land Deals Around the World (2006-2009) 
 
All Reported Deals Reliable Data 
 
Number of Deals Hectares (millions) Number of Deals Hectares (millions) 
Agriculture 1162 82.9 591 32.5 
Forestry 78 3.1 65 2.2 
Livestock only 55 0.4 34 0.2 
Mining 91 3.9 51 1.6 
Tourism 23 2.3 8 2.3 
Industry 20 0.3 17 0.1 
Conservation 2 0.3 2 0.3 
No Information 237 12.8 31 3.8 
Total 1668 106 799 43.1 
Source: Land Matrix Data (2012). 
To this end, the massive increase in land deals leaves several wondering on the implication on 
host communities. This is based on the fact that local markets are marginally considered in the 
production process of foreign land investors. Likewise, how feasible are institutions in the host 
country able to protect and bolster the rights/privileges of land owners. These will be examined 
in the subsequent sections.       
2.2 Land and Institutions in Selected Countries 
The study presents information on the countries where massive land acquisition has been 
reported, the 16 countries selected include: Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. As earlier noted, the countries selected are countries 
where the instances of LSFLDs have been reported (IFPRI and Land Portal).  
Table 3: Indicators of land, food security and institutional quality in selected Countries 
 
s/n 
 
Country 
arlandp 
1998  2008 
agrivalu 
1998     2008 
Net food export 
1998      2008 
RQ 
 1998 2008 
PHR 
2000      2008 
1 Angola 0.22 0.19 13.03 6.64 -356.20 -1148.57 5.90 16.90 25.50 38.82 
2 Cameroon 0.39 0.32 25.33 19.47 115.36 78.43 26.30 26.10 37.86 32.97 
3 DRC 0.14 0.11 47.18 42.47 -182.54 -486.15 1.00 5.30 20.11 31.18 
4 Egypt 0.04 0.04 17.11 13.22 -2474.65 -3487.00 15.60 21.30 30.11 33.57 
5 Ethiopia 0.16 0.18 52.56 43.83 -105.29 -109.07 12.70 19.80 42.60 32.89 
6 Ghana 0.20 0.18 40.23 29.05 357.23 471.06 47.30 55.00 67.41 67.41 
7 Kenya 0.16 0.14 31.23 21.05 -196.89 -243.92 35.00 50.70 53.00 54.81 
8 Madagascar 0.20 0.16 30.58 24.81 -38.19 -81.28 21.50 41.50 71.53 58.20 
9 Malawi 0.23 0.21 35.58 30.11 -47.23 147.34 44.40 38.60 54.82 50.60 
10 Mali 0.45 0.39 46.47 36.54 -55.12 -155.44 37.60 40.60 58.22 57.11 
11 Mozambique 0.23 0.20 30.84 30.47 -157.31 -275.43 36.60 35.30 64.62 57.07 
12 Nigeria 0.25 0.25 49.00 33.00 -839.68 -1964.84 18.00 29.50 45.84 37.49 
13 Sierra leone 0.12 0.17 61.80 50.21 -128.15 -109.31 9.30 7.20 48.02 52.33 
14 Sudan 0.50 0.48 46.35 26.25 135.26 -745.62 7.80 7.20   
15 Tanzania 0.27 0.22 33.76 29.71 -262.38 -343.14 37.10 38.20 63.43 56.93 
16 Zambia 0.53 0.43 21.14 18.95 -138.71 -52.84 49.30 41.10 46.81 54.57 
 Average 0.26 0.23 36.14 28.49 -273.41 -531.64 25.34 30.46 48.66 48.42 
The indicator of land used is arable land ha per persons (arlandp) and agricultural value added as 
percentage of GDP (agrivalu) was used to reflect the relative productivity of the agricultural 
sector in the selected countries. Net food export, which is a proxy for food security was derived 
as the difference between food export and food import. Regulatory quality (RQ), which measures 
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations. 
Participation and human rights (PHR), the RQ and PHR was used as a proxy for institutional 
quality (Kaufmann et al). The value of RQ was used as percentile -ranging from minimum of 0 
(poorest institutional quality) to maximum of 100 (excellent institutional quality).  
One major fact that can be inferred from the values in Table 3 is that all the countries 
experienced declined arable land per persons between 1998 and 2008. Likewise, agricultural 
value added as a percentage of GDP in all the 16 countries experienced some degrees of 
reduction in their agricultural production. On the average the agricultural value added as 
percentage of GDP declined from 36.41% in 1998 to about 28.49% in 2008 and in some of the 
countries like Angola, it reduced by almost 50% as it dropped from 13.03% to as little as 6.64%. 
With regards to the indicator of food security, apart from Cameroon, Ghana and Malawi, all 
other countries experienced negative net food export in 2008. Comparing the two periods, the 
average net food export worsened by decreasing from $-273.41 million in 1998 to $-531.64 
million in 2008. Given the reduced arable land per persons accompanied by reduced net food 
export, there could be possible relationship between the two variables. As can also be observed 
in Table 3, the indicator of institutional quality had an average value of 30.46 in 2008 and some 
of the countries like DRC and Sudan; it was as low as 5.30 and 7.20, respectively. This reflects 
the level of weak institutional framework in the countries, which might have been one of the 
factors for the increased LSFLDs experienced by them. 
In furtherance, the study examined the trends in agricultural export (agrex), food export (foodx) 
and food import (foodm) using the mean values of the 16 countries for the period 1995-2008. As 
shown in Figure 3, the variables had upward trends; however, agricultural and food exports 
exhibited some fluctuations. The crucial observation that can be made is that the food import was 
consistently above food export throughout the period. The trend indicates that the selected 
countries are increasingly becoming net food importers. This can be attributed among others to 
the weak institutions and growing insufficiency of land to boost the productive capacity from 
agricultural activities.  
  
Note: Logarithmic transformed values were used to show the rate of change and make them more comparable. 
Source: Authors’ computation using African Development Indicators 
 
Figure 4 is instructive as the trajectory for land available for agricultural purposes witnessed a 
consistent decline. The information in the graph about the plot of arable land ha per persons 
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Figure 3. Trend in Agric & Food Export in Selected Countries 
indicates that the value has continuously declined over the period 1995-2008, except in 1996, 
2003 and 2005. Another issue is that the value is less than 0.5 ha per persons. As can be observed 
from the graph, between 1995 and 2007, the value for arable land ha per persons has reduced 
more than 200%.  
 
Figure 4 Trend in Arable Land ha per persons in the Selected Countries (1995-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ computation using African Development Indicators  
Having established the declining trend in agricultural land availability and the marginal 
production from agricultural activities, the study went further to examine the relative institutional 
qualities of these countries. We compared the institutional performance of these countries with 
the average values for SSA. This is intended to observe their institutional quality relative with 
the average value for SSA. We used four measures of institutional quality—rule of law, control 
of corruption, regulatory quality and government effectiveness. These variables are gathered 
from Kaufmann et al and their values range from -2.5 (worst/weak) to +2.5 (best/strong) 
institutional quality. 
Table 4 presents, among others, the measures of rule of law (RL) and the control of corruption 
showing the average value for the entire SSA and the 16 sampled countries. RL reflects the 
extent to which economic agents (inclusive of household land owners and foreign land investors) 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. This includes the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights protection and the effectiveness of the legal systems. While the 
control of corruption reveals the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain and 
the extent of elitist capture of the state for private interests. As reflected in table 4, the lower 
these scores, the easier it is for foreign investors to relent in their responsibilities since they are 
able to influence community leaders and public officers with private gains. 
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Table 4: Institutional Quality in the Selected Countries and SSA Average 
  1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
      Rule of Law (RL)       
Angola -1.60 -1.57 -1.62 -1.46 -1.34 -1.25 -1.28 -1.24 
Cameroun -1.44 -1.15 -1.16 -1.16 -1.14 -1.01 -0.99 -1.04 
DRC -1.95 -2.11 -2.01 -1.87 -1.82 -1.79 -1.68 -1.61 
Egypt 0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.15 -0.09 -0.11 
Ethiopia -0.84 -0.72 -0.82 -0.79 -0.69 -0.56 -0.60 -0.76 
Ghana -0.32 -0.44 -0.03 -0.11 -0.24 -0.02 -0.10 -0.07 
Kenya  -0.98 -1.11 -0.96 -1.00 -0.89 -0.89 -0.98 -1.01 
Madagascar -0.63 -0.69 -0.32 -0.23 -0.14 -0.41 -0.46 -0.84 
Malawi -0.41 -0.56 -0.57 -0.66 -0.42 -0.53 -0.29 -0.14 
Mali -0.50 -0.51 -0.47 -0.38 -0.28 -0.40 -0.35 -0.46 
Mozambique -0.83 -0.91 -0.81 -0.75 -0.75 -0.70 -0.66 -0.50 
Nigeria -1.19 -1.30 -1.14 -1.45 -1.5 -1.14 -1.12 -1.21 
Sierra Leone -1.49 -1.18 -1.38 -1.33 -1.1 -1.16 -1.03 -0.94 
Sudan -1.60 -1.57 -1.46 -1.24 -1.52 -1.35 -1.50 -1.32 
Tanzania -0.21 -0.37 -0.42 -0.46 -0.4 -0.46 -0.28 -0.51 
Zambia -0.63 -0.58 -0.55 -0.49 -0.58 -0.63 -0.50 -0.49 
Average of 16 -0.91 -0.93 -0.86 -0.84 -0.8 -0.78 -0.74 -0.77 
SSA -0.75 -0.73 -0.72 -0.71 -0.77 -0.73 -0.74 -0.74 
 
Control of corruption (CC) 
 
Angola -1.16 -1.39 -1.55 -1.21 -1.31 -1.19 -1.22 -1.33 
Cameroun -1.16 -1.22 -1.03 -1.10 -1.08 -1.03 -0.90 -0.98 
DRC -2.06 -1.81 -1.71 -1.53 -1.44 -1.51 -1.31 -1.38 
Egypt -0.07 -0.28 -0.40 -0.33 -0.46 -0.52 -0.67 -0.56 
Ethiopia -1.16 -0.55 -0.45 -0.50 -0.72 -0.65 -0.66 -0.70 
Ghana -0.22 -0.31 -0.16 -0.32 -0.27 -0.03 -0.06 0.09 
Kenya  -1.03 -1.13 -1.00 -1.02 -0.87 -0.89 -1.01 -0.91 
Madagascar 0.20 -0.42 -0.05 0.13 -0.12 -0.25 -0.10 -0.27 
Malawi -0.22 -0.36 -0.37 -0.97 -0.76 -0.73 -0.59 -0.42 
Mali -0.44 -0.62 -0.64 -0.38 -0.37 -0.44 -0.47 -0.68 
Mozambique -0.36 -0.71 -0.68 -0.72 -0.74 -0.66 -0.55 -0.40 
Nigeria -1.16 -1.17 -1.25 -1.47 -1.36 -1.19 -0.92 -0.99 
Sierra Leone -0.78 -0.94 -0.93 -0.80 -0.88 -1.12 -1.07 -0.76 
Sudan -1.28 -1.00 -0.93 -1.02 -1.31 -1.17 -1.49 -1.33 
Tanzania -1.03 -1.12 -1.11 -1.01 -0.67 -0.40 -0.51 -0.49 
Zambia -1.03 -0.92 -0.94 -0.98 -0.86 -0.74 -0.48 -0.57 
Average of 16 -0.81 -0.87 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.78 -0.75 -0.73 
SSA -0.59 -0.63 -0.58 -0.59 -0.67 -0.64 -0.62 -0.60 
Source: Authors’ compilation/computation using Data from World Governance Indicator (2011). 
From the Table, SSA countries performed poorly, considering that the RL score ranged from 
0.71 to -0.77. Similarly, the sampled countries performed even worse as they had a lower score 
ranging from -0.77 to 0.93. During the period, some countries had score as low as -2.11 and 2.01.  
Considering that the countries had negative scores for most of the period apart from Egypt that 
had positive scores in both 1996 and 2004, it will be rational to conclude that these countries 
legal system are not efficient to foster the protection of private properties and ensure qualitative 
contract terms especially in the case of foreign land acquisition. Likewise, the extent of 
corruption and elitist capture still remain high based on the SSA control of corruption ranging 
from -0.59 t0 -0.67. The average value for the sampled countries is also disheartening as it 
remains in lower pedestal to SSA. This becomes an issue as households and landowners suffer 
by the dispossession of their ancestral lands to foreign investors, with poor benefits, because of 
corrupt practices from public officers and traditional leaders. Jacques (2010) observe that land 
acquisitions in Africa are cascaded with corruption due to the weakness of the government to 
enforce proper contractual agreement. This is the case in most parts of Africa where the 
government and other public officers engage in land contracts with foreigners with the intention 
of self actualisation. The Shonga case in Nigeria is an evident to this. Cotulla (2011); Aabo  and 
Kring (2012) emphasized the height of lack of transparency in the land deal processes in most 
African countries. This will foster corrupt practices and elitist capture.          
The quality of policies formulated by the government and the implementation of same for the 
promotion of private sector development was examined using the sampled countries. In cases 
where there is poor regulatory quality, the issues of unfair dealings come to be because there are 
no adequate institutions to regulate excesses of economic agents when dealing with related 
parties. From the Table 5, the value of the regulatory quality for SSA was negative in all he 
period. Similar reflection is observed from the values of the individual countries. Most of the 
countries had negative values for most of the period. This signifies that in these countries, there 
are poor policies to promote efficient private sector development.  
The issue of land grabbing and the attendant severe consequences on the household and 
community cannot be resolved without sound regulatory qualities. In some cases, where lands 
are taken over for exploitation, land degradation and pollution become paramount and with poor 
regulatory qualities as observed from the Table, the communities suffer. Some of these 
consequences include pollution of the water accessible to the communities, air pollution bringing 
about organic mutations and the likes. However, the government responsiveness becomes 
cardinal.  
Table 5  Institutional Quality in the Selected Countries and SSA Average 
  1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
 Regulatory Quality (RQ) 
 
Angola -1.45 -1.72 -1.82 -1.48 -1.25 -1.14 -1.06 -1.05 
Cameroun -1.13 -0.64 -0.60 -0.89 -0.66 -0.86 -0.83 -0.72 
DRC -1.83 -2.41 -2.11 -1.51 -1.59 -1.32 -1.30 -1.60 
Egypt 0.01 -0.34 -0.35 -0.50 -0.49 -0.42 -0.18 -0.18 
Ethiopia -1.34 -1.18 -1.16 -1.23 -0.96 -0.95 -0.83 -0.88 
Ghana -0.38 -0.24 -0.09 -0.46 -0.34 -0.06 -0.02 0.09 
Kenya  -0.37 -0.34 -0.30 -0.20 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24 -0.13 
Madagascar -1.05 -0.82 -0.46 -0.28 -0.32 -0.19 -0.32 -0.59 
Malawi -0.29 -0.23 -0.22 -0.47 -0.51 -0.45 -0.48 -0.57 
Mali -0.48 -0.24 -0.12 -0.44 -0.45 -0.41 -0.40 -0.47 
Mozambique -0.54 -0.29 -0.17 -0.30 -0.46 -0.52 -0.47 -0.37 
Nigeria -0.83 -0.93 -0.75 -1.26 -1.34 -0.91 -0.78 -0.78 
Sierra Leone -1.61 -1.33 -1.39 -1.27 -1.00 -1.17 -0.97 -0.72 
Sudan -1.37 -1.36 -1.44 -1.29 -1.17 -1.21 -1.47 -1.36 
Tanzania -0.42 -0.41 -0.25 -0.56 -0.45 -0.31 -0.50 -0.41 
Zambia -0.42 -0.12 -0.27 -0.62 -0.53 -0.65 -0.45 -0.49 
Average of 16 -0.84 -0.79 -0.72 -0.80 -0.74 -0.68 -0.64 -0.64 
SSA -0.75 -0.71 -0.67 -0.68 -0.74 -0.73 -0.74 -0.71 
         Government Effectiveness (GE) 
 
Angola -0.84 -1.36 -1.46 -1.25 -1.34 -1.43 -1.07 -1.12 
Cameroun -1.00 -0.74 -0.67 -0.82 -0.73 -0.92 -0.79 -0.89 
DRC -1.69 -1.97 -1.96 -1.74 -1.47 -1.66 -1.68 -1.72 
Egypt -0.15 -0.17 -0.21 -0.41 -0.26 -0.61 -0.44 -0.43 
Ethiopia -1.28 -0.94 -0.91 -0.93 -0.71 -0.59 -0.41 -0.35 
Ghana -0.11 -0.14 0.02 -0.20 -0.27 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 
Kenya  -0.34 -0.49 -0.54 -0.70 -0.59 -0.62 -0.56 -0.54 
Madagascar -0.58 -0.83 -0.64 -0.47 -0.44 -0.57 -0.63 -0.82 
Malawi -0.51 -0.31 -0.38 -0.69 -0.70 -0.75 -0.51 -0.40 
Mali -1.21 -1.05 -0.87 -0.63 -0.66 -0.77 -0.90 -0.88 
Mozambique -0.14 -0.39 -0.43 -0.44 -0.56 -0.59 -0.44 -0.47 
Nigeria -0.98 -1.12 -0.94 -0.99 -0.80 -0.88 -0.98 -1.20 
Sierra Leone -1.47 -1.46 -1.46 -1.51 -1.12 -1.18 -1.17 -1.19 
Sudan -1.12 -1.22 -1.19 -1.13 -1.23 -1.14 -1.28 -1.37 
Tanzania -0.73 -0.42 -0.42 -0.35 -0.37 -0.44 -0.48 -0.50 
Zambia -1.06 -0.86 -0.86 -0.83 -0.77 -0.78 -0.74 -0.80 
Average of 16 -0.82 -0.84 -0.81 -0.82 -0.75 -0.81 -0.75 -0.79 
SSA -0.72 -0.69 -0.69 -0.68 -0.72 -0.77 -0.75 -0.77 
Source: Authors’ compilation/computation using Data from World Governance Indicator (2011). 
This study underpins that in situations where the government are responsive to the ordeals of the 
citizens, the adverse consequences of land grab will be marginal. This is based on the fact that in 
cases where foreign investors are not able to meet up with their agreements, the government is 
supposed to take adequate measures to ensure the attainment of such agreement. However, in 
cases where they are easily influenced, foreign investors will find their way through.   
The data in Table 5 reveals the extent of government responsiveness by using government 
effectiveness as a measure. Government effectiveness reflects the quality of public officers, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. It includes the independence of the government and the extent they 
can easily be influenced. As seem in the table 5, the SSA countries records negative values; this 
suggests that the governments in these countries will be easily influenced and when policies are 
developed, the political will to ensure the adherence to such policies will be lacking. Therefore, 
this signifies the intense extent of land grab in these countries.    
From the foregoing, this study has been able to prove that institutional quality matter in the 
extent of foreign land grab in Africa. As the Tables reveal, the countries with the most issue of 
foreign land acquisition have low institutional qualities. 
3.0 Data and methodology 
To further buttress the ongoing analysis, the study adopt an empirically investigation of the 
impact of large scale land acquisition on agricultural export in selected Africa countries where 
cases of LSFLD have been reported. The study selects 16 countries in Africa where the issue of 
foreign land deals have been reported. It analyzed the availability of land to agricultural 
production using the period 1995-2010. This is to establish the extent of land rush in these 
countries during the periods of media report (2006-2009) as reported in Table 2.1. Given the role 
of governance and institutions in this discourse, the study also brought to bear the data on 
institutional quality including: property rights and rule based government, voice and 
accountability, strength of legal rights, rule of law, regulatory quality, government effectiveness 
and property and human rights. 
The econometric analysis used panel data on the 16 countries for the period 1995-2008 to estimate 
the formulated model drawing from institutional development theories. The choice of the period was 
informed by data availability while cases of LSFLDs informed the choice of the 16 countries that cut 
across Central, East, North, Southern and West Africa. 
The generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator was used due to the short panel structure as 
well as ability to handle the challenge of endogeneity as institutions may not be exogenous 
(Acemoglu and Johnson; Meon and Sekkat; Osabuohien). In addition, the availability of land for 
agricultural production was interacted with indicators of institutional quality with a view to 
establishing whether or not both variables have joint significant influence on agricultural export and 
food security. Details on the econometric model as well as the results from GMM are in the 
Appendix because of the need to be concise. 
 
Table 8: Data sources and measurement 
Variable Description Source measurement 
agrexp Agricultural export Datamarket of Iceland (World 
Bank) 
Constant US dollar 
agval Agricultural value added (percentage of 
GDP) 
World Development Indicators Constant US dollar 
aglnd Agricultural land (percent of arable 
land)  
World Development Indicators Constant US dollar 
exchr Exchange rate World Development Indicators Rates 
Citizen Rights 
slr Strength of legal rights Datamarket of Iceland (World 
Bank) 
Number 
phr Property and human rights Datamarket of Iceland (World 
Bank) 
Number 
prrbg Property rights and rule based 
government 
Datamarket of Iceland (World 
Bank) 
Number 
Political rights and participation 
va Voice and accountability World Governance Indicators Unit 
rl Rule of law World Governance Indicators Unit  
Effective governance 
rq Regulatory quality World Governance Indicators Unit 
ge Government effectiveness World Governance Indicators Unit 
 
4.1 Econometric model 
The econometric model is based on the fact that Large Scale Foreign Land Acquisitions- 
LSFLAs may not have a direct measure in terms of its influence on agricultural export and food 
security. The study adopts the new institutional economics (NIE) theory and the Laporta et al 
(1999) theories of institutional development. Thus, we used a rather indirect proxy with the 
understanding that the occurrence of large scale foreign land acquisitions (LSFLAs) will reduce 
the domestic land availability for agricultural production, which may affect agricultural export 
and food security. The dependent variable is agricultural export as reported in African 
Development Indicators (ADI). 
The model for the study is: 
                                             
Since institutions may be endogenous in nature and may cause the problem of endogeneity in the 
model. Therefore, equation (1) can be rewritten as:  
          
                                         
Our measures of institutional quality were grouped into three as indicated in table 8 above. 
Indexes capturing different categories of the institutional variables were obtained which include 
Citizen Rights (crg) generated from strength of legal rights, participation and human rights, and 
property rights and rule based government. Also, political rights and participation index (prp) 
was generated from voice and accountability, and rule of law while effective governance index 
(gvn) was generated from regulatory quality and government effectiveness. 
Also, additional variables were generated which shows the interactions between institutional 
qualities (crg, prp, gvn) and agricultural land as percentage of land area (aglnd). The interaction 
between the indicators of institutional qualities and agricultural land (crg_aglnd, prp_aglnd & 
gvn_aglnd) was generated with a view to capture the effect when relating the institutional 
qualities with the agricultural land as well as the coefficient of consequent influence on the 
dependent variables. 
The models to be estimated with the inclusion of the interacting variables are as specified below: 
          
                                                      
          
                                                      
          
                                                      
Hypothetically, when the coefficient of crg_aglnd, prp_aglnd & gvn_aglnd is positive, it could be said 
that institutional quality will promote agricultural land capacity to enhance agricultural export 
and food security. In that case, better institutional quality would be deemed as complementing 
the agricultural land to boost agricultural export and food security. The converse would imply 
that institutional quality is poor accelerator of agricultural land in promoting export and food 
security. 
4.2 Econometric Analysis 
The econometric results presented in this sub-section were mainly made to further buttress the 
analysis from our descriptive stylized statistics. Thus, the results are presented in the Appendix 
while the major issues and implications are briefly summarised herein. The results in Table A1.1 
were obtained using the indicators of institutions obtained from the data market of Iceland; their 
categorized indexes interacted with agricultural land. In Table A1.1, columns A, B and C 
represent agricultural export equation using the indicators of institutions from citizen rights, In 
the same manner, columns D, E and F in table A2.1 are the equations with agricultural export 
controlling for the indicators of institutions from political rights and participation while columns 
G, H and I in table A3.1 shows the agricultural export equation with institution indicators of 
effective governance.  
As can be seen from the results, the test statistics for the evaluation of the model, namely: AR(1), 
AR(2), Sargan and Wald indicate that the model was efficient and the estimate can be reliable. 
Prior to this estimation based on system GMM, a preliminary analysis was done using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE). However, this 
study focused on GMM estimates with a view to handle the possible challenge of endogeneity. 
Examination of the explanatory variables shows that the lagged values agricultural export with 
different indicators of institution and indexes had the expected positive signs. However, the past 
value of agricultural export was statistically significant at 5% in explaining the current 
agricultural export. The implication of this is that what happens to agricultural export in the year 
has significant influence in the following year. Results from table A1.1 where the performance of 
agricultural export under the institutional indicators of citizen rights was observed show that all 
measures of institution were significant except strength of legal rights (slr). An index of slr, phr 
and prrg was generated in order to obtain a strong measure of citizen right (crg) which was 
found to be highly significant. Likewise the indicator of institutional framework (crg) becomes 
highly significant with expected when interacted with agricultural land. With regards to 
agricultural land, the values had expected signs in columns A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I. It was 
statistically significant in all the equations but the coefficients became relatively larger with 
interaction variables 
The implication of the above is that agriculture land is essential in promoting agricultural export 
but the extent to which it becomes very useful lies in the nature of institutional quality of the 
country. This finding becomes interesting when it is viewed from the lens that most LSFLDs 
investors usually target countries that do not have strong institutions. In the selected African 
countries context, the need for strengthening institutional framework cannot be over emphasised. 
Though there was no direct LSFLDs case study using agricultural land as proxy, one could find 
some empirical evidence to suggest stronger institutional framework as panacea to managing 
land resources from the standpoint of the issue of LSFLDs. Thus, institutions matter. 
Likewise, results as readily available in table A2.1 and A3.1 where institutional framework 
capturing political rights and participation, and effective governance respectively reveal similar 
trend as discussed above. In table A2.1, though the indicator of voice and accountability was not 
significant and negative but the index (of va and rl) was significant and become highly 
significant when interacted with the proxy for LSFLD (agricultural land). Also in table A2.1, 
though the index of rq and ge was not significant but became highly significant when interacted 
with agricultural land. As observed in table A1.1, the coefficient of agricultural land becomes 
relatively larger with interaction variables. The findings from our estimation results have 
important implication for agricultural trade in developing Africa countries, most especially in the 
selected countries where LSFLDs were reported; as more arable agricultural land is acquired or 
grabbed by foreign investors or government, the volume of agricultural produce and exports 
dwindle which will ultimately widen the incidence of food insecurity, exacerbate poverty trap 
and culminates into foreign exchange losses. 
Other explanatory variables especially per capita income had the expected positive sign and 
significant level. Similar observation can be made for exchange rate. Agricultural value added was 
mainly significant for agricultural export, indicating that increase in the value of agricultural 
production will improve agricultural export. 
5.0 Conclusion 
The study, which was basically motivated by large scale foreign land deals (LSFLDs), made 
effort to explore the possible implications of LSFLDs in Africa with respect to agricultural 
export and food security.  This was done by providing some empirical evidences on the 16 
selected African countries where there has been instances of LSFLDs.  
The study concludes that most of the selected countries experienced considerable decline in 
arable land per persons. Similarly, it was found that most of the selected countries are net food 
importers indicating threat to food security, which has worsened between 1998 and 2008. The 
study established that reduction in arable land ha per persons was accompanied by increased net 
food importation indicating possible association between arable land ha per person and net food 
import. It was also found that the indicator of institutional quality in the selected countries was 
rather weak, which was relatively lower than the SSA average. Thus, the study confirms that 
most investors of LSFLDs mainly target countries that do not have strong institutional quality.  
In the same manner, the empirical investigation from the study found the interaction variables 
(crg*aglng, prp*aglng and gvn*aglng) to exert a highly significant variation on agricultural 
export. This implies that availability of agricultural land has an important implication for 
agricultural export of the host country. In cases, where land are acquired to service the teeming 
population of home country of foreign investors or government; the host country is left 
vulnerable to incidence of food insecurity, as majority of rural dwellers in Africa rely on 
subsistence farming for livelihood. In the same manner, the host country losses foreign exchange 
accruable from agricultural export, farmer’s income falls, food inflations rises, which will 
ultimately expands the threshold of poverty. 
The study concludes by recommending the need for strengthening institutional framework 
especially the promotion of reliable legal and procedural mechanism in order to protect local 
rights and take into cognisance the aspirations of citizens. It also calls for assessment of social 
and environmental impacts as well as transparency in decision-making whenever there are 
transactions involving land deals. Thus, the study calls for case study to further provide empirical 
evidence on impact assessment on samples of land deals in Africa. This will help to examine the 
negotiation process and possible impact such deals will have on the immediate host community. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1.1                   Agricultural export (citizen rights) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (A) (B) (C) 
VARIABLES lagrexp lagrexp lagrexp 
    
L.lagrexp 0.845*** 0.755*** 0.729*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0539) (0.0675) 
agval 0.0113** 0.00799* 0.00805* 
 (0.00498) (0.00471) (0.00467) 
aglnd -0.00605*** -0.00750*** -0.216*** 
 (0.00199) (0.00198) (0.0523) 
lgdpc 0.328*** 0.208* 0.228** 
 (0.117) (0.111) (0.111) 
exchr -5.38e-05 -0.000161*** -0.000125** 
 (4.64e-05) (5.80e-05) (5.51e-05) 
slr 0.0187   
 (0.0267)   
phr 0.00718**   
 (0.00327)   
prrbg 0.208**   
 (0.0855)   
crg  0.456***  
  (0.101)  
crg_aglnd   0.0110*** 
   (0.00266) 
Constant 0.129 -4.882*** 4.030*** 
 (0.887) (1.294) (1.550) 
    
Observations 212 212 212 
Number of id 16 16 16 
  
Table A2.1 Agricultural export (political rights and participation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (E) (F) (G) 
VARIABLES lagrexp lagrexp Lagrexp 
    
L.lagrexp 0.871*** 0.890*** 0.879*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0492) (0.0435) 
agval 0.0144* 0.0175** 0.0203* 
 (0.00774) (0.00833) (0.0115) 
aglnd -0.000484 0.000499 -0.0813*** 
 (0.00102) (0.000917) (0.0212) 
lgdpc 0.275 0.354* 0.459* 
 (0.194) (0.210) (0.272) 
exchr -3.72e-05 -1.51e-05 -2.07e-05 
 (5.31e-05) (5.49e-05) (4.83e-05) 
va -0.0145   
 (0.0656)   
rl 0.236**   
 (0.117)   
prp  0.117*  
  (0.0606)  
prp_aglnd   0.00423*** 
   (0.00112) 
Constant 0.753 -2.665* -0.919 
 (2.129) (1.384) (2.531) 
    
Observations 167 167 167 
Number of id 16 16 16 
                         Table A3.1  Agricultural export (effective governance) 
 (H) (I) (J) 
VARIABLES lagrexp lagrexp lagrexp 
    
L.lagrexp 0.869*** 0.902*** 0.902*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0518) (0.0473) 
agval 0.0171** 0.0193** 0.0255** 
 (0.00724) (0.00840) (0.0110) 
aglnd -0.00223 -0.00144 -0.0717*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00188) (0.0164) 
lgdpc 0.284 0.369 0.551** 
 (0.196) (0.231) (0.260) 
exchr -2.90e-05 1.28e-05 3.39e-05 
 (5.00e-05) (5.08e-05) (5.29e-05) 
rq 0.192**   
 (0.0846)   
ge 0.174   
 (0.153)   
gvn  0.113  
  (0.0708)  
gvn_aglnd   0.00363*** 
   (0.000822) 
Constant 0.811 -2.926** -2.063 
 (2.250) (1.397) (2.600) 
    
Observations 167 167 167 
Number of id 16 16 16 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
